

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LOURENCO MARQUES

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

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EXDIS

CAPE TOWMUFOR EMBASSY

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR UR XF

SUBJECT: ZAMBIAN OFFICIAL'S VIEW ON SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY FOR
AFRICA

1. SUMMARY. DURING TWO HOUR CONVERSATION ON ANGOLA AT OAFD
SUMMIT AND FOLLOWING, PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER
MARK CHONA DISGRESSIONED TO EXPOUND THEORY HE HAS ABOUT
SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY IN AFRICA. SOVIETS, CHONA BELIEVES,
HOPE CONSTRUCT BELT OR LOOP OF AFRICAN CLIENTS RUNNING ALONG
EASTERN AND WESTERN SEABOARDS WITH CONNECTING "LOOP" IF
SOVIET-BACKED NATIONALIST LEADER JOSHUA NKOMO SUCCESSFULLY
ACHIEVES POWER IN RHODESIA. IN THIS CONTEXT, CHONA
SEES SOVIETS INCREASING THEIR MILITARY AID TO TANZANIA
AND MOZAMBIQUE WHILE DECREASING THEIR INVESTMENT IN

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UGANDA. CHONA HAD ALSO HEARD SOMEWHERE THAT SOVIETS

BETERMINED MAINTAIN FOOHOLD THEY NOW HAVE IN ANGOLA AS COMPENSATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEATS SUFFERED AT HANDS OF US IN PORTUGAL AND MIDDLE EAST. CHONA INTERESTED IN USG REACTION HIS VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

2. CHONA BEGAN BY SAYING HE BELIEVED USSR HAD GIVEN UP ON ITS EARLIER CONCEPT OF A TRANSVERSE LINE OF INFLUENCE ACROSS AFRICA FROM SOMALIA THROUGH UGANDA INTO ANGOLA. WHAT SOVIETS NOW SEEM TO BE DOING IS TO CONSTRUCT A BELT OR LOOP RUNNING DOWN EASTERN SEABOARD OF INDIAN OCEAN FROM SOMALIA THROUGH TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND ANOTHER BELT ALONG WESTERN SEABOARD FROM GUINEA THROUGH CONGO BRAZZAVILLE INTO AOLA AND NAMIBIA. TWO BELTS COULD BE LOOPEED IF SOVIETS WERE TO CHOOSE TO WORK THROUGH "THEIR MAN" IN RHODESIA, ANC INTERNAL WING LEADER JOSHUA NKOMO, WHO IS ENTERING CRITICAL STAGE IN HIS ATTEMPT AT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH IAM SMITH.

3. CHONA SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION SOVIETS WOULD BE DZEEASING THEIR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UGANDA WHILE INCREASING IT TO TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. FIRST OF ALL PRES NYERERE VERY MUCH WANTS MIGS AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED ARMS WHICH CHINESE CANNOT SUPPLY. IN PART THIS IS RELATED TO SIMPLE FACT OF POLITICAL ENVYF PRES MOBUTU OF ZAIRE HAS MIRAGES. BUT THERE ARE PRACTICAL DEFENSE REASONS. NORTHERN TANZANIA WAS ONCE AIR-ATTACKED FROM UGANDA BY MERCURIAL AMIN. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT IS FACT THAT NYERERE WANTS TO BE PREPARED SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA MOVE INTO MOZAMBIQUE AS IT MOVED INTO ANGOLA. NYERERE IS SUPPORTED IN THIS THINKING BY MACHEL'S FEARS AND FEELINGS OF INSECURITY.

4. I CONFESSED THIS ALL SEEMED RATHER STRANGE IN VIEW OF CHONA'S EARLIER STATEMENTS TO ME THAT MOZAMBIQUE WAS PURSUING A DOUBLE-TIERED POLICY INVOLVING (A) PUBLIC FULMINATION AGAPNST SOUTH AFRICA, WHILE (B) PRIVATELY ENJOYING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CHONA IMPLIED THAT BOLDNESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN ENTRY INTO ANGOLA MAY HAVE BEEN A DECISIVE FACTOR AFFECTING RECENT THINKING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING OF ZAMBIA'S EASTERN NEIGHBORS.

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5. RETURNING TO NYERERE, CHONA SAID THAT ONE OF THE OBVIOUS VALUES TO TANZANIAN LEADER OF CDIAN STATE VISIT AT THIS TIME WAS LEARNING FROM INDIANS HOW TO DEAL WITH SOVIETS WITHOUT LOSING SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE.

6. CHONA THOUGHT KENYA POST-KENYATTA MIGHT BE SQUEEZED IN THE PROCESS OF SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS GRAND STRATEGY OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS. HE ALSO BELIEVES SOVIETS SEE SEYCHELLES

WITH THZUCOMORO ISLANDS, MAURITIUS AND MALAGASY AS USEFUL TO THEIR PURPOSES.

7. THERE WAS SUGGESTION IN CHONA'S MUSINGS THAT SOVIETS MIGHT BE THINKING OF "GETTING RID OF AMIN" AND INSTALLING SOMEONE MORE CONSISTENT AND RELIABLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD DECIDED TO DROP OR DOWNPLAY UGANDA IN THEIR OVERALL STRATEGY. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT HE FELT AMIN NEEDS BOLSTERING, PREFERABLY THROUGH MOBUTU, IN PAYMENT BOTH FOR HIS USEFULNESS AT OAU SUMMIT AND TO THWART SOVIET MANIPULATIONS.

8. AS FOR NAMIBIA, CHONA SAID THE SOVIETS DESIGN HERE SEEMED TO BE SIMILAR TO THAT PLANNED FOR ANGOLA, TO PICK A FAVORITE, IN THIS CASE SWAPO, AND TO BACK THAT MOVEMENT TO EXCLUSION OF OTHERS, NOTWITHSTANDING FACT THAT THIS DULLED CHANCES OF OTHER ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY AND WAS UNDEMOCRATIC. CHONA POINTED OUT THAT SWAPO SHOWED AT OAU SUMMIT THAT IT DID NOT RPT NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED AS A SOVIET TOOL EVEN THOUGH ITS PRESENT WEAK ANDMEDIocre LEADER (NUJOMA) WAS PLIABLE AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE.

9. EITHER AT ADDIS SUMMIT OR AT DAR POST-SUMMIT MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE OF ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND BOTSWANA, CHONA HAD ALSO HEARD FROM SOME AUTHORITY WHOSE CREDIBILITY HE TRUSTED THAT SOVIETS HAD LEFT MIDDLE EASVSAND PORTUGAL WITH "TAIL BETWEEN THEIR LEGS" IN CLEAR PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT TO UNITED STATEA. THUS SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED THAT THESE BITTER EXPERIENCES NOT RPT NOT BE REPEATED IN ANGOLA WHICH MUST BE A SUCCESS FOR THEM AND THEIR CUBAN COHORTS. CHONA CONCLUDES THAT IF HIS THEORY ABOUT SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY FOR AFRICA OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS IS CORRECT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CUBAN PAWNS

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FROM ANGOLA. ONE ELEMENT NOT TOUCHED ON BY CHONA IN HIS ANALYSIS-- PERHAPS BECAUSE IT IS SO OBVIOUS--IS SOVIET HOPES OF MATCHING CHINESE SUCCESSES IN AFRICA.

10. IN CONCLUDING, I TOLD CHONA THAT HIS ANALYSIS MADE SUCH SENSITIVE QUESTIONS FOR AFRICA AS DIEGO GARCIA ALL THE MORE RELEVANT. HE SAID IT CERTAINLY DID AND ASKED IF IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE WASHINGTON COMMENTS TO HIS PURELY PERSONAL THEORY AND ASSESSMENT, BASED AS IT WAS ON ADMITTEDLY LIMITED INTELLP3,:3. TOLD HIM I WOULD PASS HIS REQUEST ON.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD BE OF GREAT USE TO US AND PERHAPS OTHER POSTS, AS WELL AS TO CHONA, TO HAVE UP-DATED AND TIMELY INR OR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT OVERALL

SOVIET DESIGNS IN AFRICA. THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN FORMAT
SUITABLE FOR PASSING CHONA AND OTHER SELECTED AFRICAN
OFFICIALS.
WILKOWSKI

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